The regulation of working conditions for Africans, 1918 - 1948 by Duncan, David
. UNIVERSITY OFTHEWITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG
HISTORY WORKSHOP
STRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE MAKING OF APARTHEID
6 - 1 0 February 1990
AUTHOR: David Duncan
TITLE: The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans,
1918 - 1948
i) Introduction
By anybody's reckoning, the State ha6 played a major role in the
development of South Africa's mining and industrial economy. From
the first discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, the State was
involved in regulating the conditions of play- issuing licenses
for miners, drawing taxes from the huge profits to be earned
there, and assisting in controlling the black labourers who
performed the menial work. Once the goldfields of the Transvaal
opened up, Kruger's Republic, the British post-South African War
administration, and, subsequently, the Union Government, sought
to ensure that employers had the necessary supplies of, and
control over, black workers, to sustain long term profitability.
To this end, successive central authorities enforced contracts
under criminal law, operated pass laws regulating the flow of
workers, and sanctioned the importation of cheap, bonded, foreign
labour from China and neighbouring territories. In 1911, the
first Onion Government created the Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) as
a sub-department of the Native Affairs Department to coordinate
this work.(1)
The 'control' function was only one side to the State's
involvement in labour regulation. The other major goal was to
guarantee the long term viability of primary and secondary
industry by preventing clashes between workers and management,
and by minimalising the loss of human life. This involved setting
up authorities to inspect working conditions, and to rectify the
most dangerous and unhealthy features of industrial life. These
were the aims behind the appointment of mines inspectors on the
Rand in the 1890s, and, in part, behind the establishment of the
GNLB. In both cases, the officials who performed these tasks were
also expected to contribute to the efficiency of the enterprises
they were inspecting, by advising the Government and employers on
appropriate improvements. These two cadres of officials, together
with the Factory Inspectorate, form the central subject of this
paper. The latter organisation, founded in 1919, was not given
such a wide brief. Here, the Government's intention was more
purely geared towards improving conditions and applying health
and safety regulations. The reasons for this, the ways in which
it affected the working principles of the Factory Inspectors, and
the ways in which those principles changed over time, are
crucially important in explaining the State's relationship with
labour in mines and industry, during this period.
In order to understand the role of the State, it is essential to
bring together both theoretical insights and empirical evidence.
At one level, the State operated in the classic Marxist sense as
a straightforward relation of production. The State existed to
create the conditions in which mining and industrial capital
could thrive. It took steps to provide employers with the
'differentiated' forms of labour which their respective
production processes and cost imperatives demanded;(2) and it
looked to the longer term interests of capital (in ways which
Hemployers could not) by regulating working conditions through its
various administrative departments. Yet this i6 hardly enough to
explain the complicated nature of the State's interference in the
labour market. After all, in the final analysis, anything the
State does, short of actually confiscating the means of
production, could be said to be in the long term interests of
capital in one sense or another. From its inception, the State
developed its own interests alongside those of individual
employers and groups of industries. Pre-eminent among these was
the preservation of the State's authority itself- an element
which transcended the popularity of any one Government or
political party. In ideological terms, this meant ensuring the
legitimacy of the State among the voting public, and achieving at
least a grudging respect for its powers among the rest of the
population. Closely linked to this was the need to preserve the
physical well-being of the State, a priority usually discussed
under the heading, 'law and order'. The third element involved
the fiscal security of the State, which was sustained through
taxation, either of business enterprises or of individuals. For
the most part, these aims could be achieved in accordance with
the interests of the 'ruling classes' as a whole; but they were
nonetheless considered distinct by those who saw themselves as
holding the true interests of the State at heart.
To a large extent, those who saw themselves a6 giving expression
to the State's interests were not the cabinet ministers, whose
eyes were focused on the next election; but the civil servants.
From Onion in 1910 through to the advent of 'apartheid' in 1948,
the South African State bureaucracy grew by leaps and bounds. At
the same time, Parliament tended to frame legislation in very
general term6, leaving it to the administrators to guide their
ministers by adding long schedules to the acts. The rules could
be changed at short notice and without reference to the House of
Assembly, and represented a considerable usurpation of the powers
of Parliament. Nowhere were civil servants given more latitude
than in the field of 'native' administration, both in the
reserves, and in urban and industrial areas.
For Karl Marx, "the key to understanding bureaucratic power lies
in it6 location within wider social and historical processes".(3)
In broad terms, these' pertained to the class divisions which
arose in industrialising societies, and the role of the
bureaucracy in regulating class conflict. As we shall see, this
feature is self-evident in the way the three departments under
discussion handled working conditions. Officials exercised what
Poulantzas describes as their "relative autonomy as a specific
social category", in a conscious attempt to mediate class
conflict.(4) In doing so, civil servants were comfortable in the
idea that they were serving both the interests of the ruling
(i.e., shareholding) classes, and those of the State itself. Once
again, though, we must beware of thinking that we have the whole
picture. In addition to these grand sets of interests, officials
were moved by the sorts of internal pressures and unanticipated
consequences which Max Weber identifies in any large bureaucratic
organisation.(5) Procedure, power, prestige and principles- like
the four 'p'e of marketing, these factors affected the way
administrators formulated and implemented policy.(6) Under
procedure, one must consider the ritualistic over-emphasis on
rules, the adherence to code6 of regulations which could take on
a significance of their own in the minds of officials, and work
against the introduction of innovative measures. Second,
officials concerned with their own career advancement and with
the wider reputation of their branch of the civil service were
often preoccupied with departmental power and prestige- a
'lightening of the load' of official duty was always feared,
while the ultimate bogey was that of professional embarrassment.
The idea that some officials were moved by principles or morals
is more difficult; but a residual sense of 'trusteeship'- of duty
to protect the African from the adverse effects of contact with
the white man- was still a part of the administrative psyche, at
least in the NAD.
As the following sections show, officials were capable of serving
several different masters. In some cases, the interests of
employers were purposefully advanced by the activities- or
inactivities- of State inspectors. Those interests could also be
served in a roundabout way, perhaps by bringing one or two rogue
employers to heel to salvage the image of the rest. However, at
other times, bureaucrats acted on behalf of what they saw aB the
State's interests, or a sub-section of the State, or even on
behalf of a group of workers. Such cases do not necessarily
signify the malfunctioning of the State's constituent parts, or
even subservience to the long term interests of capital. They
indicate, rather, that branches of the State could be responsive
to other interests without bringing down the whole edifice.
There is a danger that, in moving away from a reified picture of
the State, we lose sight of the enduring harshness of the system
as it affected black workers. While official inspection did have
a significant impact in improving safety standards and curbing
aome of the worst abuses, the average treatment meted out to
Africans in mines and industry remained very poor. One must take
into account the ways in which different officials regarded their
duty, and their structural position within the State, as
significant factors in determining the extent and impact of work
place regulation.
ii) Factories, Shops and Offices.
The two principal interests concerned, those of
employers and employees respectively, are frequently in
conflict and the Department, when called upon in the
course of its statutory activities to decide a thorny
point, must endeavour to choose a course of action
calculated to promote the objects of the law and the
well-being of those concerned.(7)
State supervision of workplace conditions was, like every other
aspect of labour regulation, a thorny issue. Employers generally
weighed every interference by State officials in terms of how it
affected their profits, and resisted legislation which would
force compulsory improvements. At the local level, ingrained
habits of cutting corners and evading rules meant that factory
inspectors had to be constantly on their guard against minor
infringements, especially given the huge expansion of secondary
industry in this period.
Factory inspectors were further preoccupied by two other
considerations. From 1924, it was the express policy of the
Government to promote the employment of civilised labour in
secondary industry. This tended to lessen the Department of
Labour's enthusiasm for enforcing too strictly unpopular
regulations. The ability of many newly-created and fragile
industries to bear careful scrutiny of their working conditions
was untested- there was always the danger that inspectors would
overload them with rules, and drive them out of business, with
the Ios6 of 'civilised' jobs. On the other hand, the department
was pushed by an increasingly vocal white trade union movement to
take action against wayward employers, and to improve conditions
generally. This led to head-on conflicts between unionists and
administrators in the Labour Department, who liked to think of
themselves as doing their best for the working man. In his 1937
report, the Secretary for Labour complained about..
..a stream of abuse which not only does disservice to
the workers' cause., but inevitably raises doubts as to
the sincerity of any future representations from that
same source.(8)
Despite this hostility, the Labour Department took protests from
organised white labour seriously, investigating their complaints
in full, and reporting back to the trade unions concerned.
The development of South Africa'6 industrial workplace
legislation began with the long overdue Factory Act of 1918. This
provided for the appointment of a cadre of factory inspectors
under a chief inspector, with power of entry to any factory.(9)
All factories had to be registered within six months of the act
coming into force. Standards were laid down for ventilation,
sanitation, lighting, statutory holidays, and the employment of
juveniles and pregnant women. A fifty-hour week was laid down for
adult workers (reduced by the Factories (Amendment) Act 26 of
1931 to forty-eight hours), and pay for overtime was at time-and-
a-quarter. The Minister could grant exemptions to the above
regulations if the factory worked seasonally, or was subject to
intermittent supply of raw materials. Voluminous regulations were
published in December 1918, with further instalments in
subsequent years.(10)
The Factories Act was introduced at a time when Governments
around the world were beginning to compare their treatment of
workers, and to set international standards. The International
Labour Organization, which arose out of the Treaty of Versailles
and whose conferences were normally attended by South African
delegates, helped to focus the Union Government's attention on
factory conditions. However, the 1918 act, although basd on the
British'principles of centralisation and specialisation of the
insoectorate, did not go as far a6 the U.K.'s Police, Factories
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1916, which was another
stimulus behind the South African legislation. In another sense,
the whole Victorian tradition of State regulation of working
conditions, which stretched back to the Factories Acts of 1844
and 1847, was behind this act.(11) South African inspectors had a
lot of catching up to do, and lacked the experience of their
British counterparts. On the positive side, they were conscious
of not having to cope with antiquated, dangerous plants dating
back fifty or a hundred years. The bulk of the Union's industrial
development 6till lay ahead of it.
In 1924, with the founding of the Department of Labour, the
operation of the act was passed to that department. This does not
appear to have aroused much animosity among the inspectors. Their
work was largely separate from the rest of the Mines Department,
6O there was little chance of losing out on promotions within the
department. The old Deputy Chief Inspector, HC Fowler, became
Chief Inspector under the Secretary for Labour, CW Cousins.(12)
The Inspectorate's powers were further increaed in 1931, when the
regulation of machinery under the Mines and Works Act was divided
between the Mines, Labour and Agriculture Departments.(13)
This accretion in the duties of the factory inspectors, coupled
with the rapid growth of the industrial sector after 1933,
naturally increased the factory inspectorate's experience in the
pre-Second World War era. In the process, the inspectorate was
able to embellish its image as an organisation of experts,
entrusted with the noble task of safeguarding life and limb, and
in general promoting the care and welfare of the work force.
Departmental reports portrayed the' inspectors as scrupulously
fair-minded and objective. In terms that could have come straight
from the pages of Weber's "Theory of Social and Economic
Organization", the Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker, argued in
1941 that the inspectors were perfectly capable of handling the
abnormally high level of delegated responsibilty to be introduced
as departmental regulations under the new act of 1941.(14)
Without wishing to cross swords with those who view
with disapproval the modern tendency to govern by
regulation, I must point out that this 'modern
tendency' arises from the necessities of the present
day world, and not from any desire on the part of civil
servants to exercise their brief authority.(15)
The critics who troubled Walker hailed from both right and left.
For Afrikaner Nationalists, the State's declared policy of non-
discrimination in the application of the Factories Act was an
easy rallying point for raising race-consciousness. Women's
Congresses affiliated to the Provincial Agricultural Unions
passed resolutions protesting against the employment of white
women by Asiatics, of Africans in the same room as white women,
and of Africans in enterprises which manufactured foodstuffs.
This last point they linked ta a concern for health and hygiene-
it would be much safer, they argued, to reserve certain jobs in
abbatoirs, dairies and bakeries for whites, and thus also
promote the 'civilised labour' policy. The Department of Labour
rejected this for two reasons. Most importantly, neither Hertzog
nor Smuts would agree to overloading secondary industry at one
blow with a more expensive and untrained white labour force.
Industrialists rejected this out of hand, and many businesses
which already employed a per centage of white workers would have
folded. In any case, such a move would have derailed the
Government's longer term strategy of raising industrial wages
very gradually, through the Wage Board.
Second, any shift towards Government-sponsored racial demarcation
in factories would have encountered fierce opposition from the
left in South Africa, and from overseas. It would have completely
exposed the department's veneer- thin as it was at times- of
being non-discriminatory in its administration of labour
legislation. Department of Labour officials were anxious to avoid
the impression that their aim was to break up what little working
class solidarity there was in the inter-war years. By the same
token, they could not be seen to be creating the conditions for a
low wage policy in industry based on the exploitation of cheap
black labour. The department, after all, had been established in
part to persuade white workers of the Pact Government's
commitment to their welfare and advancement. To this end, Labour
officers went to great lengths to present themselves as unbiased-
even to the point of denying any knowledge of unfairness, other
than the 1911 Mines and Works Act- "which I understand'.', wrote
Walker disingenuously, "contains a colour bar of this
nature".(16)
Consequently, Labour Department officials had to fend off the
right wing, by pointing to the immense practical difficulties
that would be involved in keeping whites in separate rooms from
blacks, and arguing that this would ultimately limit the scope of
employment for whites in factories. The final compromise came in
the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941. To
appease both right and left, Section 51 allowed the Governor-
General to insist on segregated rest rooms, eating areas and so
on for the different races. As Walker insisted in a letter to a
white trade union:
The Minister wishes me to point out that the Bill does
not contain any provision under which any class of
labour could be excluded from any occupation on the
grounds of race or colour and it is, therefore,
considered incorrect to refer to the Act as containing
a colour bar.(17)
The white unions were not only concerned by the prospect of being
undercut by black workers who could be treated a6 inferior
employees. The general operation of the Factories Act was also a
point of issue. In 1939, the General Secretary of the Trades and
Labour Council claimed that the failure to pass a new Factory Act
that year was a blow to thousands of workers. The act was out of
date, he argued; employers openly flouted it, and inspectors were
too willing to grant exemptions. There was an urgent need for new
provisions for annual leave, rest periods, night work, child
birth, breaks in employment, and protection for the young.(18)
Labour Department officials were piqued by the implication that
they were not doing their job properly. In response to the TLC's
protest, an in-house investigation wa6 carried out in all the
major industrial centres to furnish proof that inspectors were
administering the regulations to the best of their ability.
However, South African industry had undergone major changes since
1918. Of 5754 factories registered under the act in 1939, 3597
had been established since 1933.(19) Moreover, the report
indicated serious problems to do with overtime regulations,
visiting factories in outlying areas, and the powers given to
management once exemptions had been granted. These difficulties,
plus the passing of the U.K.'s Factories Act of 1937, encouraged
departmental officials to lend their full support to the
Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941.
The British act extended the definition of 'factory', expanded
welfare services for workers, and enlarged the staff of the
inspectorate.(20) South Africa's legislation moved in a similar
direction, though in some, respects at a slower pace. The
definition of a factory was extended, ordinary hours of work
reduced to forty-six per week, and overtime pay raised to time-
and-a-third. Paid holidays were introduced, and the minimum age
for employment rose from fourteen to fifteen. A range of other
general 6afety measures concerning the operation of machinery,
the fencing of electrical apparatus, floor space, ventilation,
and lighting were al6o tightened up.
The new Factories Act took its place alongside the Shops and
Offices Act of 1939, which extended similar protection to workers
in those sectors for the first time.(21) Again, the act left the
Department of Labour with wide powers to be defined later in the
form of administrative regulations. Both pieces of legislation
looked impressive on paper, and there can be no doubt that they
were considerable, if belated, steps in the right direction. But
the impact of the new laws on black workers was limited for
several reasons. In the first place, the 1941 Factories Act was
not applied until September 1945.(22) This was intended to allow
industry to work unimpeded for the war effort, and may well have
been due to personal interference from Smuts.(23) The benefits of
the new act for African workers were further reduced by the
regulations drawn up under section fifty-one. Black6 and whites
working at the same benches were supposed to be as far apart as
possible, and separate conveniences were to be provided.(24) And
finally, the act excluded labourers working within the precincts
of a factory (such as packers and handlers), the vast majority of
whom were Africans.(25)
In these subtle but important ways, the Department of Labour
operated laws which treated white and black workers differently,
while maintaining the fiction that their administration was free
of discrimination. The purpose behind the non-discrimination
principle was something more than public relations. As in any
sphere of industrial relations, to push special regulations for
whites too far would cause wholesale displacement of whites by
blacks, who already in the 1930s and 1940s were gaining a
foothold in semi-skilled positions. This was coupled with the
commitment of the State as a whole to promoting the profitability
of industrial capital and, from 1939, to maintaining productivity
for the war effort.
It is tempting to eee the regulations enforcing racial and gender
segregation at the work place as strategies to forestall the
development of a united proletariat, both by the Nationalists who
demanded it, and by the Labour Department which enforced it. Yet
the idea that the Labour Department was party to a conspiracy of
this nature does not fit with its wider policy statements on
labour legislation. The original Industrial Conciliation and Wage
Acts had been intended to buy off the white working class; but
the department had soon found how difficult it was to leave black
workers out in the cold.(26) It was much easier for Labour
officials to encourage the incorporation of blacks into the white
trade unions and the I.C. Act, rather than to make comple-tely
separate provision for them, and then face opposition from the
left and from employers. The Factories Act had never really been
intended to apply discriminately, except where public pressure,
particularly that stirred up by Afrikaner Nationalists, made some
form of segregation a political necessity. The fact that the
Government in ite legislation, and the Department of Labour in
its regulations, bowed to that pressure in the 1940s, is more a
reflection of prevailing social values and their manipulation for
political ends, than it is proof that this branch of the
capitalist State was hell bent on the bifurcation of the working
classes.
iil) Down the Mines
The State's powers of control over working conditions in the
mines were defined in the Mine6 and Works Act of 1911. This laid
down certain basic standards- no women or boys under sixteen
(later changed to fourteen) to work underground; no work to be
done on Sundays, except maintenance, emergencies and milling of
ore in mill6 established before 1911; a maximum working day of
eight hours; and a maximum working week of forty-eight hours.(27)
It was left up to the Department of Mines to draw up regulations
for the duties of managers and overseers, the safety and health
of employees in minee and works, the provision of ambulances and
medical aid, and granting certificates for blasting, engine
driving, engineering, overseeing, surveying and management. These
jobs were reserved for white workers in the notorious 'colour
bar' enshrined in Regulation 285.
The act was administered by the Mines Division of the Department
of Mines and Industries. This was split into three sections- the
Mining Commissioners and the Registrar of Mining Titles, who
issued licences for prospecting and mining titles; the Geological
Survey; and the Engineering Branch, headed by the Government
Mining Engineer. His authority extended over the Inspectors of
Mines, Machinery and Explosives, the last of whom came under the
Explosives Act of 1911.(28) Unlike the Factory Inspectorate, the
GME's responsibilities were twofold- to ensure the physical
safety of those working on the mines, and with machinery or
explosives; and to advise the Government on technical mining
matters. He was thus placed in the potentially awkward position
of having to serve two masters- the immediate demands of health
and safety; and the wider requirements of the State in its
relationship with the mining industry.
The crux of the argument in this section is that the GME and his
inspectors did indeed take both imperatives into account. Their
work was complicated by the fact that the industry was hugely
important in the political arena, much more so than secondary
industry for most of this period; and by the peculiar nature of
the production process in mining, with its many, varied and
constantly changing points of production underground, and its 'ad
hoc' approach to the geological, financial and labour-related
problems which it encountered. At no point could mines inspectors
concentrate solely on the relatively simple task of ensuring the
physical well-being of workers, as even the most basic health and
safety issues had immediate political and economic overtones.
Mine politics in the twenties and thirties have been carefully
scrutinised from other perspectives by Rob Davies and David
Yudelman. The latter has unearthed some interesting information
on the two GMEs, Sir Robert Kotze (1908-1926) and Dr. Hans Pirow
(1926-37). According to Yudelman, both appointments were
political- Kotze's at the Instigation of his old friend, General
Smuts, and Pirow's through un-named members of the Pact
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Government.(29) He praises both men- Kotze "represented the most
intelligent and knowledgeable part of the state bureaucracy",
while Pirow is described as young and inexperienced, but very
able.(30) Yudelman falls into the trap of judging his subjects
according to how well they understood hie theory of a symbiotic
relationship between state and mining capital (Creswell is
condemned for misunderstanding it completely).(31) On the other
hand, hie assessment of their part in mine politics is sound.
Kotze played a key role in opposing the white labour policy of
Creswell and the white trade unions in the 1910s and 1920s.(32)
He also did little to improve underground working conditions, and
instead, lent his considerable experience towards promoting the
profitability of the big mining companies.
Kotze's ability to do business with the Randlords was most
strikingly illustrated when he chaired the Low Grade Mines
Commission in 1919-20. William Gemmill and Evelyn Wallers,
respectively Joint Secretary and President of the Transvaal
Chamber of Mines, were also members. The commission's report
considered ways of dealing with the unprofitability of the low
grade mines, and of alleviating the shortage of cheap black
labour on the goldfields. The idea of raising African wages was
roundly condemned- the report showed uncharacteristic concern for
secondary industry here, arguing that this would merely draw
labour away from other sectors, and precipitate an industrial
crisis.(33) On the other hand, lifting the 'colour bar' was
recommended to allow management more room for manoeuvre in its
organisation of the labour process.(34) Here again, the report
sounded spuriously pious, appealing to principles of 'abstract
justice' on behalf of black workers. The third major proposal was
again guaranteed to outrage white workers- that of opening up
further catchment areas for recruiting migrant labour. The
commission further bolstered the mineowners' case by arguing that
it would be no bad thing if some low grade mines closed down.(35)
On the related question of accidents underground, Kotze at first
denied that the increasing rate was due to changes in the ratio
of whites (supervisors) to blacks in the early 1920s; but was
then forced to agree that the reduction of supervision over
jackhammer teams contributed to the rising number of misfire
accidents. He accepted under pressure that less accidents would
occur if there were more inspectors, but did not demand a larger
staff.(36)
In hi6 lack of concern for safety, Kotze was no more extreme than
his successor, despite Pirow'6 years of safety-related research
in London. (37) In 1930, Pirow drew up suggestions for the Low
Grade Ore Commission which would have done his old boss proud.
Pirow argued that the best way to save money and make millions of
tons of low grade ore profitable was to remove as many whites
from underground as possible. White miners who had worked for ten
years would be found surface work. This would serve one health
function, as it would cut down the incidence of phthisis, and
thus also save money. The flow of migrant labour would also be
augmented, as underground labourers would fill more 6emi-skilled
positions, and so have the opportunity of earning higher wages-
though obviously not the wages previously paid to whites.(38)
Although the Kotze Commission opposed the legalised 'colour bar',
both GMEs excused the overt discrimination on the mines by
referring to the crude racist stereotypes common in society at
that time. For example, Kotae stated boldly that Africans had
reached the limit of their abilities doing semi-skilled work on
the coal mines.(39) Pirow later argued that two white men had to
be present when precious metals were handled because one could be
surer of the honesty of a white employee than a black one. While
such prejudices certainly existed among members of other state
departments, it is unusual to find them used so blatantly as
arguments in official documents. The contemptuous, utilitarian
attitude which Kotae and Pirow showed towards black workers wae
of a sharper, more vicious order than that of most civil servants
of the period.
The attitudes of more lowly Mines Department officials were
exposed in the disputes over staff ratios in the mid-1920s. From
1924, the presence in the Cabinet of several Labour Party members
triggered renewed efforts by white miners to reverse the trend
towards fewer white overseers and falling real wages. The South
African Mine Workers Onion (SAMWU) supported the findings of the
Mining Regulations Commieeion of 1924, which attributed the
rising accident rate to the increasing responsibilities being
shouldered by white miners.(40) The miners took their stand on
the issue of health and safety, and condemned the record of the
mines inspectors:
The Deputation then remarked on the futility
of the inspection conducted by the Mining
Engineering Department. It is useless and
quite ineffective. The number of inspectors
is quite insufficient and there is too much
sympathy between the mine management and the
inspectorate who have no sympathy with the
miner.(41)
Colonel Creswell then took up the struggle, calling for a report
on the dismissal of white miners, and urging the use of the
inspectorate to prevent the emasculation of the underground
supervisory staff.(42) Most inspectors responded that there was
no appreciable diminution of the white staff, and that the
general practice was not to overload men with work. However,
Charles Gray, the Inspector of Mines for Johannesburg, admitted
that supervision of drilling had fallen off, and that the greatly
increased speed of drilling was causing a rise in misfire
accidents.(43) He went on to describe his Job as being near
impossible. Overlapping shifts made it extremely difficult to
tell what a particular miner's job was. Conditions down the mine
varied from day to day, and the inspector received little support
from the workers; who were afraid of gaining a bad reputation
with mine officials. In any case, it was left up to him to decide
whether a work load was reasonable- there were no objective
standards. This involved weighing efficiency against eafety, and
neither of these criterion had been defined. His evidence was
borne out by a deputation from the Witwatersrand White Miners'
Association to the Ministers of Mines and Labour. T.C. Hynd
claimed that he knew caeee where one man supervised sixteen
drilling machines on several levels at once, and with the taek of
charging up to 150 holes in an hour. He agreed that the
inspector's job was hard- miners generally knew when an inspector
was coming, so he rarely saw a mine working normally.(44)
Gray's outburst suggests one reason why working conditions
underground were not regulated as carefully as in secondary
industry- the shifting nature of the work and the many points of
production complicated the task beyond the comprehension of a
factory inspector. Yet for the most part, mines inspectors did
not complain about their duties. They busied themselves with
promoting the efficient working of the mine, and presented
accident rate statistics in the best possible light. They did not
dispute ratios of supervisors to labourers, and did not call for
more inspectors to make their jobs easier. In general, they
supported the policies of mine management against the protests of
Creswell and the white trade union movement. They acted, in a
sense, as a Trojan Horse for the mining industry within the
State.
Yudelman portrays Kotze as the consummate civil servant, the
official who realised instinctively where the true interests of
the State lay. For Yudelman, these centred on the profitability
of the gold mines, the defeat of the white miners, and the
docility of the mase of unskilled, migrant black workers. Looked
at in comparison with the Factory Inspectorate's handling of
working conditions in secondary industry, one must ask why these
two departments saw the needs of the State (or, to take a more
crudely Marxist line, those of the 'ruling classes') so
differently. R.H. Daviee would probably argue that it related to
the relative strengths of various 'fractions' of capital.(45)
Yudelman might see it more in terms of the pre-eminent position
of the gold-mining industry in the economy. As he shows, the
weakened position of white workers after the Rand Revolt allowed
the mines to extend the retrenchment of white labour; the
election of the Pact Government in 1924 brought little relief for
white miners, despite the promises of the Labour and Nationalist
parties. Others might bring up the comparative strengths of
organised workers in the two sectors in the 1920s, and their
differing capacities to insist on better working conditions. Or
again, one might refer to differences in the production process,
or to the exigencies of profit-making at near impossible depthe
beneath the ground, or in competition with cheap foreign imports.
All these factors are important in analysing the ways in which
administrators approached the issue of work-place regulation.
However, in the Mines Division a6 in other state departments, one
must refer to the social background and attitudes of the
administrators to understand why they supported a particular
policy, and how they reacted to external pressures. In the case
of the GME and his staff, it was not simply a question of blindly
obeying Government directives. Both Kotae and Pirow actively
participated in drawing up strategies to improve productivity and
circumvent opposition from white labour. In doing so, they
interpreted very broadly their administrative function of
'advising the Government on technical mining matters".
In part, their close association with the drive to improve
efficiency may be explained by their background as engineers and
scientists. The GME's staff held professional qualifications; if
they had not found posts in the civil service, they would have
been working for the 6ame mines they inspected. As engineers,
they were trained to seek ways of overcoming technical
difficulties, and in the department, they were encouraged to
apply their knowledge for the sake of the mining industry. The
issue of how to deploy the labour force was so important for the
industry and was so bound up with the more technical and
mechanical matters, that inevitably, inspectors found themselves
dealing with questions which directly affected pay, staffing
levels and working conditions. At the same time, mining
inspectors were not expected to think like social workers; unlike
their colleagues in the factory inspectorate, they were not privy
to the nineteenth century, British, reformist tradition of caring
for the material comfort of the labourer as a worthy goal in its
own right. The Mines Division was established in the days of the
Kruger Republic, at a time when state intervention in working
conditions was minimal; it had struggled alongside the mineowners
and their managers and technical staff to overcome the huge
physical obstacles which threatened to bar the way to profitable
deep level mining in South Africa. For purely experiential
reasons, it was therefore unlikely that mining inspectors would
formulate and implement stringent regulations which might drive
some businesses under. On the other hand, it was not eo
surprising that Kotze, on leaving the Civil Service, became a
director of De Beers, while Pirow was appointed consultant at
Corner House.(46)
IM-
iv) Working Conditions and the Native Labour Regulation Act
I must naturally keep in touch with native labour
conditions from the four points of view from which I
have to approach it; in the first place I advise the
Government on matters of policy in connection with
labour; I have to see that the mining industry and
employers of labour who employ agents get fair play
from their employees in so 'far as it come6 under
Government control, and I have to see that the labour
agent's interests in so far as they are legitimate are
properly protected, and to ensure that the native
labourer gets a square deal from the two.(47)
The Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 was passed to help
ensure an adequate supply of migrant labour for the gold mines,
and to centralise State control over African workers in
industrial areas. The act empowered the Director of Native Labour
to issue licenses to labour recruiters and employers who hired
recruited labour. Compound managers, who supervised large numbers
of Africans on mines and 'works' (where machinery was used), were
also obliged to obtain licenses. The DNL was in charge of
Inspectors of Native Labour (INL), who were to act as the
'protectors' of labourers, inquiring into grievances, but also
fining workers whom they Judged to be not fulfilling their
contracts. Contracts were supposed to' be attested before an
officer of the NAD, who would ensure that workers understood the
terms. Most INLs operated in the Transvaal, though others were
appointed for the Kimberley and Barkly West (for the river
diggings), in Natal (for the coal and sugar areas), and in the
Free State (for the diamond and coal mines). Labour districts
were proclaimed under the act, again mostly in the Tranevaal, in
which tighter pass laws were applied. These areas were governed
by special regulations for housing, feeding and hospital
treatment. Municipalities had the power to operate their own
regulations for compounding under the Native (Urban Areas) Act of
1923.(48) The DNL retained his powers of inspection in places
where machinery was used.(49)
The history of the NAD's sub-department of Native Labour was not
entirely a straight line, although the DNL was enforcing
substantially the same regulations at the end of the period as he
was in 1918. The Native Labour Bureau received a major shake-up
alongwith the rest of the department in 1923, at the hands of the
Public Service Commission (PSC). The thrust of the Commission's
report was that the DNL's staff should be cut.(50) The old
command structure did not permit proper supervision of staff, and
left INLs and Pass Officers working independently of each other.
In any case, the report argued, such close control over mine
labourers' working conditions was no longer necessary. Mining
operations had shrunk, and employers now treated their workers
much more sympathetically. The report recommended cutting the
number of labour districts on the Rand from eight to four, with a
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net saving of L2568 per annum. The DNL's salary would be cut from
L1500 to L950, and his office combined with that of the
Johannesburg sub-Native Commissioner, and the Native Commissioner
for the Witwatersrand.(51)
Saul Dubow ably describes the political manoeuvringe of the hard-
liners within the South African Party, who felt that the 'old
guard' administrators in the NAD were too lenient on Africans to
deal with post-war militancy among Africans, and to apply
repressive counter-measures.(52) This sentiment was by no means
universal; the cute to the NAD faced widespread opposition,
notably in a series of articles on 'Native' Administration by
E.H. Brookes.(53) From within the State, the outgoing SNA, Edward
Barrett, fought a bitter but ineffectual battle to keep his
position. Yet the sub-department of Native Labour did not attempt
a similar defence of its operations. The chief reason for this
was that the DNL, Colonel S.M. Pritchard, wanted to take early
retirement.(54) Pritchard gave the commission the evidence it
needed to reduce the sub-department's staff, and then took credit
for raising the efficiency of his operation, and allowing
sweeping economies.(55) The PSC rewarded him by permitting him to
retire in January 1924, and making Herbert Cooke DNL and Chief
Native Commissioner for the Rand.(56)
The new DNL remained in office for eight years. He was well
suited to operate a system which kept black workers firmly in
place, while arguing that the entire structure was to their
benefit. Before the Mills and Holloway Commissions, Cooke painted
a very rosy picture of the services the sub-department provided
for Africans. He argued that NAD officials were becoming more and
more sensitive to the needs of the African worker.(57) The
department's officers remitted money urgently needed by
distressed families back in the reserves. They handled the
estates of deceased migrant workers; instituted inquiries for men
worried about their relatives; and even induced employers to
'liberate' a worker if his wife was seriously ill.(58) In 1931,
Cooke presented the Native Economic Commission with a memorandum
listing the advantages of the act for Africans. Under cross-
examination, he claimed triumphantly that strikes and disputes
were a thing of the past: labourers now had so much confidence in
NAD officials that they counted on them to settle grievances,
amicably and equitably.(59) Before both commissions, the DNL
appears to have been given considerable latitude by the SNA,
Major Herbst, whose opinions were generally similar to Cooke's.
The DNL may have exaggerated to counter the image of the NAD as
the poor sister of the Civil Service, a department of cranks and
liberals which served no real purpose other than to complicate
the higher work of Justice, Mines and Agriculture officials. In
addition, he may have felt the need to defend himself from the
more progressive elements on both commissions- especially Bill
Andrews and Frank Lucas in 1925, and the latter again in 1931.
Likewise, the wider image of the NAD as an organisation which
managed to couple paternalist care with even-handed
administration of severely restrictive legislation was always
important to its members. Whatever his reasons, he also made
clear his acceptance of the whole apparatus of State control- the
paees laws, the masters and servants laws, compulsory compounding
and repatriation on the completion of a contract- and his
opposition to major changes in the migrant-labour system. In
this, he appears to have been moved in equal measure by concern
for mining profits, fear of the social consequences of an ever-
increasing urban African population, and anxiety at how the NAD
could deal with such a problem in administrative terms. If mine
labourers were stabilised on the Rand with their families, it
would put up working . costs. It would also promote venereal
disease and the sale of illicit liquor, which would bring down
productivity.(60) The wider problem was that when an industry
closed down, the urbanised African and his family had nowhere to
go. Missionary education lifted them above the level of the
labouring class, but left them without any marketable skills.
Thus, the NAD was left to deal with large numbers of unemployed
people who lived by their wits. Migrant labour was the lesser of
two evils; its only drawback was the 'unnatural vice' it
encouraged among mineworkers.(61)
Unlike the Factories and Mines Inspectorates, Inspectors of
Native Labour were first and foremost concerned with the living
conditions provided by employers. This did not mean, however,
that they placed an intolerable burden on the employers. On the
Simmer and Jack Mine in the 1930s, for example, the DNL only took
action when the Tuberculosis Research Committee pointed out that
poor facilities for Africans could rebound on the health of white
workers.(62) The local Member of Parliament, C. Potgieter, took
up the issue, protesting that the NAD had no right to allow
Africans to be employed under such degrading conditions, and that
profits should not take precedence over health.
The main problems on Simmer and Jack were overcrowding, plus the
long distance labourers had to walk to the main shaft. The DNL
ignored the evidence that the mine was easily profitable, and
took the part of the mineowners. He argued- against the opinion
of the GME- that there was a danger the company would close the
mine if forced to invest in new housing accommodation. "You will
readily realise that Mining companies are averse to spending
money on new compounds for which in a few years they may have no
use", he pleaded to the SNA.(63) A report by a Public Health
Department officer that conditions in the compound were "very
unhygienic", and complaints put direct to the Minister of Native
Affairs, finally forced the DNL to approve a plan for eighty
additional rooms. But the company was able to stall until 1934,
when a new manager won acceptance from the new DNL for a much
reduced plan for twenty-five rooms.(64) At no point did the DNL
invoke his powers under regulations issued in 1911.(65) By the
time the work was underway, countless thousands of mineworkere
had passed through the compound, enduring slum conditions when
off duty, and then having to walk miles to work each day. The
mine, meanwhile, produced profits of L198.095 in 1931 alone, of
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which L41.604 was distributed as dividends.
Besides political pressure from workers and interested whites,
the other major factor which galvanised the DNL to improve
compound conditions was the effect this had on the labour supply.
The DNL inspected the Natal sugar and cotton estates in 1919,
after which inspectors were appointed to supervise housing and
feeding. But the NAD took no real interests in the situation
until the mid-1930s, when the sugar estates were struggling to
keep up their labour complements. On the basis of a departmental
report, the DNL blamed the shortage on conditions and wages on
smaller estates. A few employers were then pressured to improve
conditions for the sake of the industry's reputation.
On the mines, INLs were occasionally forced to step into the
GME's arena was to protect black miners from physical violence.
Each month, the DNL drew up a table of assaults on labourers by
white miners, and the punishment inflicted on the latter. These
usually only involved fines of a few shillings or pounds, and in
most cases the offender was not discharged.(66) The vast majority
of cases inevitably went unreported, and a regime of
subordination built on fear of the overseers was maintained. Most
inspectors appear genuinely to have regarded violence as
unnecessary and counter-productive in controlling black workers.
When mines policemen, induna6 and even compound managers were
found guilty of such behaviour, the INLs normally pressed for
their dismissal. GNLB officials accepted violence as a last
resort, as in the many cases from the later 1930s and 1940s when
they called in the South African Police with fixed bayonets; but
for the most part, they favoured compound managers who retained
at least a modicum of respect from his charges, beyond merely
dreading his appearance with a sjambok.(67)
Underground, though, the INLs' capacity to limit violence was
minimal. Beatings of labourers by 'boss-boys' and white
supervisors were everyday occurrences, a part of the labour
process, by which the supervisor drove the black miners to fulfil
the day's work quota. GNLB officials neither understood this
process, nor had easy access to it. They received little help
from the Mines Inspectors or from management, and preferred to
play down the incidents they encountered. It was left up to the
labourers themselves to protect themselves from attacks as best
they could, with little help from the law or their supposed
'protectors'.(68)
The task of 'controlling' black workers by preventing them from
disrupting production in mines and works or antagonising the
white population in general was fundamental to the very purpose
of the GNLB. This was not a function which concerned either the
GME or the Factory Inspectorate. Their duties were primarily
concerned with white workers, for whom higher intelligence and
'civilised' standards were their own restraints. African workers
were not supposed to possess those advantages, and by
consequence, had to be hedged around with various- repressive
measures to keep their minds on the job. Besides, African
workers' lack of political power allowed the State to apply
legislation which employers, at least in the wake of the Rand
Revolt, might have been happy to see extended to all employees.
These measures included the penalties contained in the masters
and servants laws, the Native Labour Regulation Act, the Urban
Areas Act, and the Native Service Contract Act for African
workers who broke their contracts, whether by striking, desertion
or otherwise. The GNLB was responsible for enforcing section
fifteen of the Native Labour Regulation Act, which prescribed two
months with hard labour or a L10 fine for breach of contract by a
'native labourer'.(69)
The importance of compounds in the minds of Native Labour Bureau
officers can hardly be underestimated. The very existence of the
cheap labour policy, which kept hundreds of thousands of
supposedly 'raw natives' on the Rand, with numerous legitimate
grievances, in close proximity to settled white populations,
could only continue so long as African mineworkers were kept as
isolated ae possible from white residents. Moreover, as Cooke
explained to successive commissions, this was the only way to
avoid desertions, falling efficiency, and the contamination of
black mineworkere through unlicensed access to drink and women.
As van Onselen has shown, the mines provided unparalleled
opportunities to control and coerce migrant workers in a way that
superintendents of urban locations could only dream about.(70) Of
course, the system aleo encouraged the development of a community
of feeling amongst the workers, ae events in 1920 and 1946
showed.(71) In time, the compound itself could be turned to the
workers' advantage, as they demonstrated mo6t recently in 1987.
But that was what the DNL and his staff were there to prevent-
their public image and professional status within the Civil
Service all depended on their self-projection ae experts who were
intimately aware of the climate of opinion in the compounds,
ready to step in, mediate, and pre-empt major problems before
they mushroomed. The mineowners were generally prepared to
tolerate this where it did not expose eerious maltreatment of the
workers, and where the demands on their resources were
minimal.(72) To them, the INLs served a purpose which they could
not perform themselves, and which was infinitely preferable to
direct, formalised representation by the workers.
From 1932 through 1948, the office of DNL changed hands every few
years. It has been suggested that the sub-department's importance
diminished in this period. One reason may be that the growing
significance of other authorities for black workers, such as the
municipalities and the Department of Labour, as well as the much-
discussed idea of giving recognition to African trade unions- may
have proportionately reduced the influence of the GNLB. Secondly,
it is possible that E.W. Lowe and C.P. Alport, who were
successive DNLs in the 1940s, did not enjoy the full confidence
of the Secretary for Native Affaire. This is borne out by Smit'e
demand that he be immediately informed of any confrontations
between black workers and their employers.
However, the declining importance of the G.N.L.B. may to some
extent be more illusory than real. A false impression is given by
the lack of archival material from after about 1935. This is not
because the records were housed at the NAD's central office- the
DNL still kept separate files- the problem is simply that these
have not been available to researchers. Far from being less buey,
the DNL was more active than ever in the war years and after,
dealing with a greatly expanded mining and industrial sector, and
a new militancy among African workers. By the 1940s, Herbert
Cooke'e boast that large strikes and disputes involving black
workers were a thing of the pa6t must have sounded like a bad
Joke to administrators. In this context, it was perhaps
inevitable that the task of handling this threat should be taken
up at the political level- frequently, in fact, by Smuts himself.
Though the political importance of the GNLB does appear to have
declined in the process, this did not amount to a complete
rejection of the policy of governing African workers through a
separate, powerful, 6trongly paternalistic administrative
structure. Whatever the notions being debated in the 1940s, the
period closed with the migrant labour system and the body which
administered to it still intact.
2.0
v) Conclusion
At the present time where a matter concerns one
Department that Department gets to work and handles it,
but you have things which concern more than one
Department, and each Department is liable to look after
its own affairs, and to bueily engage in them without
that intimate touch with other Departments interested
in the same matter which is usual and necessary in
industrial life.(73)
There were, naturally, certain features of the regulation of
working conditions which were common to all branches of the State
bureaucracy. For one thing, they all administered regulations,
which they had drawn up in consultation with the industry, and
which were designed to protect the life and limb of the labour
force. Each department divided its staff territorially under a
senior officer. Inspectors were expected to become regional
experts, and to remain in close touch with local employers. Given
the paucity of staff members and the large regions they had to
cover, these officials had to be allowed a considerable degree of
autonomy. Yet, there is little evidence that inspectors in the
same division differed much in their attitudes to their work. The
explanation for this lies in sense of 'esprit de corps', or
commonalty of purpose which developed within the division, as
well as the overall structure of the economy, and the wider
relationship of the State to the sector concerned.
On the other hand, we have 6een how the variances in the
attitudes of officials in different divisions were significant.
The effort made by the average factory inspector to improve
working conditions was of quite a different order to that of his
counterpart in the Mines Division. Why was this so? The answer
lies partly in the position of the respective sectors in terms of
economic and political muscle. Throughout the period, the gold
mines were of primary importance to the material welfare of the
State and the country ae a whole. The mineowners exercised their
political influence more concertedly and more effectively than
the captains of secondary industry. The Randlords therefore had
the power to block any attempt to enforce decent standards in
working conditions if the State ever attempted to do so. It is
significant that when major changes did at last come in mines
working conditions in the 1970s and '80s, it was the companies'
group administrations themselves that overcame individual mine
managers' opposition to doing anything which might raise costs.
Second, there is the question, of the nature of the production
process in mining and secondary industry. It was always easier to
make life safer and more pleasant in a factory or shop
environment than thousands of. feet below the ground, where the
point of production was constantly shifting. But this does not
explain the harshness of conditions in compounds which, of
course, are just as stationary and easy to inspect as a factory
assembly line. For sure, mines occasionally closed up alongwith
their compounds; but that is hardly an explanation for the lack
of expenditure on the accommodation and feeding of black
mineworkers. The slow, uneven advances thatwere made in diet,
sanitation, overcrowding, and so on, in this period, had little
overall impact on the enduring grimness and degredation of life
in the compounds.
A third argument, put by the DNL himself on occasion, was that
the cost structure of the gold mines could not support the luxury
of mollycoddling its workers, either underground or on the
surface. But an analysis of the dividends paid out to
shareholders would hardly support this. Deep level mining wae far
from easy, but there were viable alternatives to the cheap labour
policy. The fact that the mines did not attempt these was because
they believed they could make more money with a bonded, poorly
paid, migrant work force. What was more important here was not
the fact that the mines could not have survived a change in
policy, but that their propaganda succeeded in convincing many
people that this was true.
A more plausible reason why inspectors in mines, factories and
the GNLB saw their role differently, involves their understanding
of their function. To put it crudely, their attitudes were
primarily determined by who they saw as their most important
constituency. Mines Inspectors were under no illusions that they
were there to help the gold mines to produce ore, and to do so
cheaply, efficently and safely. Factory Inspectors, by contrast,
believed that their first duty was to white workers. This did not
mean that they wanted to hand the means of production over to
labour lock, stock and barrel; they accepted the constraints
which the existing capitalist system placed on them. But they did
not think in terms of forestalling revolution by partial
concessions. They really believed that the regulations they
operated were a meaningful contribution to the well-being of the
white working classes.
The primary constituency of the GNLB was the African labourer,
and the sub-department's attitudes to him largely determined its
performance as an inspectorate. In this context, the racism which
was prevalent in society at that time must be taken as an
independent variable. The NAD generally held that Africans would
not perform responsibly as employees unless subject to a degree
of control. Of course, one had to eliminate the most degrading
and exploitative conditions, in order to improve efficiency,
prevent resistance, and satisfy moral compunction; but there was
a limit to how much the white man could be expected to do for the
socially and intellectually inferior black worker, and that limit
had effectively been reached (at least on the mines) before 1918.
These factors were reinforced by the knowledge that African
labourers were not the only constituency the NAD had to deal
with. The 'four points of view' dilemma discussed above was a
very real part of the 'Weltanschauung' of the Native Labour
official in every field, and it was certainly present here.
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One might see the NAD position partly in terms of a bourgeois
ideal of service, which stood as an oppositional or alternative
cultural ideal to the middle claes concept of individualism. As
Raymond Williams argued for English society,
The stress [on service] hae been confirmed by the
generations of training which substantiate the ethical
practice of our professions, and of our public and
civil service. Ae against the idea of 'laiseea-faire',
and of self-service, this has been a major achievement
which has done much for the welfare of our society.(74)
In the inter-war South African context, the concept of service to
the wider, disenfranchised .community may be seen as a residual
culture, existing beneath the dominant culture of segregation,
and, towards the end of our period, facing new challenges from an
emergent force based on 'apartheid'.(75) The idea of an official
duty towards the bulk of the population was still well into the
1940s, shared by departmental heads such as Douglas Smit and
W.G.A. Mears, and by like-minded DNLs, such as Johannes Brink.
Yet as we have seen, this residual notion of service or
trusteeship, was never strong enough to bring radical changes to
working conditions for Africans.
In the last analysis, then, the perceptions which officials
themselves developed must be brought into the picture in order to
understand the ways in which the regulation of working conditions
operated. Each branch of the bureaucracy furthered the interests
of the State, and the State, for the most part, was at pains to
serve the interests of capital; but beyond that crude formula, a
host of disparate voices can be heard, which it behoves the
researcher to listen to.
Notes
I am very grateful to Professor A.H. Jeeves for invaluable
criticism and advice. The paper draws on a longer, more detailed
chapter in my Ph.D. thesis (in progress). The thesis is entitled
"State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa, 1918-1948".
1) The GNLB systematised and greatly expanded the work already
being done under the Coloured Labourers' Health Ordinance of
1905.
2) See D.C. Hindson, "The Pass System and the Formation of an
Urban African Proletariat in South Africa. A Critique of the
Cheap Labour Power Thesis". (University of Sussex D.Phil., 1983).
3) D. Beetham, Bureaucracy (Minneapolis, 1982), p.92.
4) N. Poulantzas, "The Problems of the Capitalist State", New
Left Review 58 (1969), p.73. B.C. Smith, Bureaucracy and
Political Power (Brighton, 1988), p.73.
5) H. Cohen, The Demonics of Bureaucracy (Ames, Iowa, 1965),
p.15.
6) Product, package, price and promotion.
7) U.G. 30-38, Dept. of Labour Report for 1937, p.3.
8) Ibid. p.3.
9) Union Year Book *8 (1925), pp.228-9.
10) Union Govt. Gazette, 2/5/19, 18/2/20, 19/11/20, 10/2/22,
22/B/24.
11) T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (London,
1942), pp.31-41.
12) Union Year Book #9 (1926-7), p.1030.
13) MNW MM2426/22, A.A.M. Anderson, Notes on the welfare of
workers in South African factories compared with the United
Kingdom, 30/7/22.
14) "Experience tends to show that the purely bureaucratic type
of organisation— that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy-
is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining
the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense the most
rational means of carrying out imperative control over human
beings... For the needs of mass administration today, it is
completely indispensable". M. Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organisation (New York, 1947), p.337.
15) U.6. 45-41, Dept. of Labour Report for 1940, p.2.
16) ARB 1132, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 1/2/44.
17) U.6. 45-41, Dept. of Labour Report for 1940, p.4.
18) ARB C.F.2/0, General Secretary, South African Trades and
Labour Council, to Minister of Labour, 31/1/39.
19) ARB C.F.2/0, Prepared answer to Parliamentary question,
14/2/39.
20) Djang, Factory Inspection, pp.75-6.
21) Statutes of the Union of South Africa. Act 41/1939.
22) Union Year Book #25 (1946), p.22.
23) During World War Two, the Government also adopted a more
lenient exemptions policy from the 1918 act. Union Archives, K302
(Van Eck Commission Papers), Box 10. Dept. of Labour Memorandum
on 2nd Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural
Requirements Commission.
24) Union Year Book #25 (1946), p.27.
25) Statutes of the Union of South Africa. Act 22/1941
(Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act), Sec. 3.
26) See Chapter 6, "The Recognition of African Trade Unions", in
my forthcoming Ph.D. thesis.
27) Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act 12/1911, Sees.6-9.
28) See Section ii.





33) U.G. 34-20, Final Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission
(Kotze Commission), para. 108.
34) Ibid. para. 182.
35) Ibid. para. 152.
36) Wits Archives, A1882. Kqtze's Evidence to the Economic and
Wage Commission 2/9/25, pp.770-2.
37) Who'5 Who in Southern Africa, p.294.
38) Wits Archives, AD1769. Lucas Papers. Summary of Pirow's
Evidence to be submitted to the Low Grade Ore Commission of
Enquiry by the GME,22/9/30. Pirow did not explain how he would
surmount the old problem of training Africans to fill semi-
skilled positions without stationing them permanently on the
mines. On an earlier phase in this debate, see A.H. Jeeves,
Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy (Montreal and
Kingston, 1985), p.32.
39) Wits Archives, A1280. Kotze's Evidence to the Unemployment
Commission (1930), para. 5047-8.
40) U.G. 36-25, Report of the Mining Regulations Commission. The
commission was chaired by William Pittman. The report argued that
the ratio of whites to blacks had fallen from 1:7.7 in 1911, to
1:10.1 in 1923.
41) MNW MM2489/25 pt.l, Minutes of meeting between South African
Association of Employees, SAMWU and the Minister of Mines and
Industries, 24/11/25.
42) MNW MM2489/25 pt.l, Secretary for Mines and Industries to
GME, 30/12/25. A misfire was an accidental explosion occurring
during blasting.
43) MNW MM2489/25 pt.l, Inspector of Mines, Johannesburg, to GME,
13/1/26..
44) MNW MM2489/25 pt.l, Notes on meeting between Witwatersrand
White Miners' Association, Secretary for Mines and Industries,
and Ministers of Labour and Mines and Industries, 5/12/25.
45) R.H. Davies, Capital. State and White Labour in South Africa.
1900-1960 (Brighton, 1979).
46) Yudelman, Emergence of Modern South Africa, p.231. Yudelman
expresses surprise at Kotze's "very unusual" move from, the
bureaucracy into private business.
47) Wits A1882, Cooke's Evidence, p.1389.
48) Statutes of the Union of South Africa. Act 21-1923,. Sec. lla.
49) Wits Archives, AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to Native Economic
Commission (Holloway Commission)* 4/5/31, p.7212.
50) GNLB 291/18/78, Report of the Public Service Commission
Inspectors on the sub—department of Native Labour, 1922, pp.4-6.
51) GNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 27/11/23.
52) S. Dubow, "Segregation and 'Native' Administration in South
Africa, 1920-1936". (Oxford D.Phil., 1986), pp.143-154.
53) "Rand Daily Mail", 27/2/23, 28/2/23, 1/3/23.
54) Pritchard had no intention of living out his retirement by
the fireside. He put his experience as DNL to work in his new
career as a labour recruiter for the Natal sugar and cotton
estates. According to Public Health Department officials, he used
his "very accurate knowledge of the care of Natives in Natal" to
exploit loopholes in the housing regulations. GES 539/13,
Assistant Health Officer, Durban, to Secretary for Public Health,
9/3/25.
55) BNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 8/10/23.
56) GNLB 291/18/78, DNL to SNA, 27/2/24.
57) Wits AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to the Holloway Commission,
4/5/31, p.7278.
58) Wits A1S82, Cooke's Evidence to the Mills Commission,
27/8/25, para. 1399.
59) Wits AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to the Holloway Commission,
4/5/31, p.7274.
60) Wits AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to the Holloway Commission,
4/5/31, p.7228.
61) Wits AD1438, Cooke's Evidence to the Holloway Commission,
4/5/31, p.7230.
62) NTS 697/408C, C. Potgieter to 0. Pirow, Acting Minister of
Mines, 12/8/32.
63) NTS 697/408C, DNL to SNA, 27/8/32.
64) NTS 697/40BC, Memorandum by DNL (A.L. Barrett) on Simmer and
Jack Compound, 5/10/34.
65) Union Government Gazette, Govt. Notice 1988, Sec.IB,
30/11/11.
66) GNLB 64/23/9, Return of Assaults Committed Upon and Hardships
Suffered By Natives for the Month of May, 1923, 3/7/23.
67) GNLB 69/23/154, Inspector of Native Labourers, Springs, to
DNL, 19/2/23. "I am satisfied that both tHe Manager and Compound
Manager are fully alive to the importance of stopping assaults on
native labourers and are doing their best in this respect. The
Compound Manager has had many years experience, is a good native
linguist and well respected by the natives".
68) Some protection against underground violence was afforded by
the recruiters, who feared that a bad reputation would make it
| difficult to recruit for a particular mine.
i
! 69) Statutes of the Union of South Africa. Act 15/1911, Sec. 14.
.
70) "It was the compound as an institution which provided the
: framework for the total exploitation of black workers". C. van
Onselen, Chibaro (London, 1976), p.157.
71) W.6. James, "The Group With the Flag: Class conflict, mine
hostels and the reproduction of a labour force in the 1980s".
Paper presented at the African Studies Institute, Johannesburg,
Feb. 1989.
: 72) "... it is the policy of the Company to avoid any
expenditure, especially on the surface, unless it can be
| justified as being absolutely necessary for, and assisting in the
| continued working of the Mines". NTS 697/408C, General Manage/",
| New Consolidated Gold Fields, to DNL, 27/10/32.
: 73) Wits A1882, Director of the Industries Division Evidence to
: the Mills Commission, 24/8/25, para. 567.
I
! 74) R. Williams, Culture and Society (London, 1958), p.328.
• 75) R. Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977), pp.122-3.
